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FACULTY COMMENT
CIVIL RIGHTS-Hawkins

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION -Municipal
Services
v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971);

HANGING TOGETHER:

EQUALITY IN AN URBAN NATION.

Taylor. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971.
(Paperbound).

William L.

Pp. 348. $3.95

The format of Professor Merson's brief article is distinct in
its combination of case analysis with literary review. The
object of combining traditionally separate law review units is
to roughly juxtapose elements which together form an analysis
of interdisciplinary ,flavor. The central value of the combined
format is its capacity for bridging traditionally exclusive research systems: the law library and the social science library.
The upshot is, we feel, a fresh and healthy direction which
offers a new perspective of the proper role of law in dealing
with contemporary social problems.
N January of 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit decided the case of Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw.' If permitted to stand, Hawkins may well augur a new
round of litigation every bit as significant as the desegregation
cases of the fifties and the reapportionment cases of the sixties.
Hawkins may, if broadly interpreted, presage the wholesale
entry of the judiciary into the labyrinth of municipal services,
at least to the extent that there are perceived inequities in
the rendering thereof. Indeed, the overriding issue raised by
Hawkins is the nature and degree of involvement of the judiciary in municipal decisionmaking of the most particularistic sort,
i.e., who receives what, when and how. It is the efficacy and
propriety of judicial action of this sort that is the subject of
this comment and review.
The circuit court decision in Hawkins is the result of
litigation commenced by a group of Shaw's Negro citizens to
challenge inequities in Shaw's rendering of municipal services,
such as street paving, street lighting, sanitary sewers, drainage,
and water, as being based on race and economic class. 2 The
degree of discrimination in Shaw is dramatically illustrated by
the undisputed evidence that nearly 98 percent of all homes
1 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'g 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
2

Discrimination based on wealth was not alleged on appeal.
286
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fronting on unpaved streets in Shaw were occupied by blacks,
and that while 99 percent of white residents were served by a
sanitary sewer system, nearly 20 percent of the black population
was not so served. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under
title 42 United States Code section 1983, 3 but were denied it by
the trial court on the following rationale:
If actions of public officials are shown to have rested upon
rational considerations, irrespective of race or poverty, they are
not within the condemnation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
may not be properly condemned upon judical review. Persons
or groups who are treated differently must be shown to be similarly situated and their unequal treatment demonstrated to be
without any rational basis or based upon an invidious factor such
4
as race.
The circuit court reversed on the ground that the trial court
erred in applying the "traditional" equal protection standard

when, in the face of the plaintiffs' prima facie case of racial
discrimination, "a more stringent standard" of review was required.5 Invoking the test of Loving v. Virginia,", the circuit
court held that a prima facie case of racial discrimination may
be overcome only by proof of a compelling state interest. After
examining the uncontroverted evidence of gross disparities in
the provision of municipal services between the black and white
areas of Shaw, the circuit court determined "that no such compelling interests could possibly justify the gross disparities in
services between black and white areas of town that this record
reveals. '"7
By limiting its consideration to statistical evidence of significant disparities, the court found it unnecessary to determine

whether or not they resulted from the discriminatory intent of
those who govern Shaw. The focus was upon results, not
motives. In thus resting its decision upon data demonstrating
racial inequities in the quantity and quality of municipal services, the circuit court appears to have shed the protective cloak
of judicial restraint heretofore characterizing court scrutiny of
municipal action. In other words, the data alone are permitted
•42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
4 Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162, 1168 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
5 437 F.2d at 1288.
6388 U.S. 1 (1967).
7 437 F.2d at 1288.
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to overcome the usual presumption of validity attaching to the
exercise of a municipality's "police power" -data in many ways
comparable to that previously used to establish inequities
between the educational opportunities of black and white chil9
dren8 and inequities in population among congressional and
state legislative districts."'
The remedy of the circuit court also borrows from desegregation and reapportionment cases. The court fashioned its
remedy not by deciding in the first instance upon a courtordained distribution of services, but by requiring the municipality to "submit a plan for the court's approval detailing how
it proposes to cure the results of the long history of discrimination which the record reveals."" In its concluding sentence,
the court, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, asserts its confidence "that
the municipal authorities can, particularly because they so
staunchly deny any racial motivation, propose a program of improvements that will, within a reasonable time, remove the dis2
parities that bear so heavily on the black citizens of Shaw.'
It would not be surprising if the stringent equal protection
standard applied in Hawkins were to precipitate a probing judicial review of the multitude of disputes which rage daily
within county boards and city councils about appropriate apportionment of municipal services. Judicial intervention of this
sort, however, may be no more likely to produce an equitable
redistribution of municipal services than to elevate the quality
of education for black children or to generate more responsive
state legislators. In short, the courts appear to be embarking
upon the same storm-tossed sea which they have encountered
before and from which they have received a very considerable
battering.
The practical impact of Hawkins may also be limited by its
facts--the grossness of the discrimination found in the town of
Shaw. Consider the possibility of applying Hawkins to the more
sophisticated context of a large urban area. The court would
then be confronting more than one minority group and a governmental bureaucracy whose decisionmaking apparatus is significantly more complicated than that in a rural town of 2,500.
Even if a court should successfully sift through the far greater
mass of data before it, and conclude, as in Hawkins that inde8Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11 437 F.2d at 1293.
12

Id.
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fensible inequities exist, the fashioning of a remedy would pose
far more serious problems.
The problems of understanding discrimination within a complex urban society and of designing an effective remedy for it
are carefully explored by William L. Taylor in his recent book
Hanging Together.1 3 The author exposes the critical linkages
which bind the kind of ineouities confronted in Hawkins to the
social, cultural, and political phenomena which are their inevitable concomitants. He states his thesis quite simply:
All of our efforts against racial injustice will fail unless we are
willing to restructure our urban system and its institutions to
provide freedom and mobility and to allocate to all citizens a
share of the responsibility for overcoming deprivation and discrimination....
[I]t is possible to establish racial and social justice and to create
livable cities, but only if both challenges are faced together
14

Thus, the urban crisis and the racial crisis are seen by Taylor
as one Gordian knot whose strands are to be untangled concurrently or not at all.
In addition to identifying the inadequacies of our prior civil
rights efforts and of the economic and social programs currently
pursued to erase glaring discrepencies between black and white,
Taylor injects the new element of suburban/inner-city conflict.
He correctly demonstrates that "Affluent suburban areas are
still left free to accept large government subsidies for highways,
sewer lines, and other community facilities without accepting
any responsibility for alleviating any portion of the poverty and
discrimination that afflict the area as a whole."' ;,
After painting a bleak picture of what the future holds
should the trends of today go unchecked, Taylor gives us his
own prescription for channeling existing discontent among both
whites and blacks into a fcrce for positive change. Finding significant disaffection of white city dwellers together with a
growing alienation of middle-income suburban whites, Taylor
argues that "[F] rom these feelings there may evolve new definitions of community, new forms of political organization of cities
in which suburban citizens would accept some of the costs of
dealing with poverty and racial discrimination in return for a
share of control over a larger environment."'" In effect, Taylor
13 W.

TAYLOR, HANGING TOGETHER

14 Id. at 10.
15 Id. at 154.
16 Id. at 217.

(1971).
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is suggesting that if the shoe pinches both black and white feet
severely enough, the momentum for change may well be sufficient to produce a spirit of compromise in moving toward
equality.
There remains nevertheless a gnawing sense that all this
has been suggested before, and that without a far greater
national commitment to the solution of these problems Taylor's
proposals will remain just that. Perhaps Hanging Together
is most useful as an articulate statement of the liberal dilemma:
wanting to believe the best of the future, but finding little
evidence to support such a belief. In particular Taylor finds
little reason to hope that the judicial system will be able to
effect significant change:
It is clear, however, at least in retrospect, that the court
decisions alone could not bring out the fundamental changes
needed to create equality of opportunity for the mass of the
Negro poor. Measured against this goal, they were subject to
a number of important limitations, some inevitable, others not.
The rulings had little direct application in the North....
The rulings could not by themselves redress economic and
social injustice....
The rulings were widely ignored and violated .... 17

Thus, it appears that Taylor would view the remedy prescribed
by the circuit court in Hawkins as wholly inappropriate to an
urban setting.
What then, is the appropriate role, if any, of the courts in
righting racial inequities, especially in the realm of municipal
services? Has the Fifth Circuit evolved a role which may make
more effective the administrative and legislative tools Taylor
and others committed to racial justice seek? Or will the court
merely be sinking deeper into a quagmire of bitter controversy
and political hostility? The answer, I think, lies in the kind
of case the courts will be called upon to decide.
If the court, as in Hawkins, must intervene, unaided by any
prior legislative pronouncements or administrative policies, it
risks the fate we have earlier suggested of stormy public reaction. That fate is manifest in desegregation rulings which have
produced an arousal of community feeling hardly matched in
the past decade by any other issue of local interest. In Denver,
for example, U.S. District Judge William E. Doyle, 8 confronted
Id. at 86-87 (italics omitted).
18 Judge Doyle was subsequently appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals on April 26, 1971.
17
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with overwhelming statistical evidence demonstrating a gross
inequality of educational opportunity for black children in Denver's inner-city schools, found an incontrovertible violation of
equal protection and thus required the development of a much
more agressive desegregation plan by the Denver School Board.19
School board elections before and after Judge Doyle's decision
had demonstrated a dominant public sentiment against any
further desegregation of the Denver public schools. Although
Judge Doyle may have had no choice but to rule as he did, his
decision resulted in a direct confrontation between the judiciary
and a hostile school board. 2 ' In this instance, the court had
virtually no allies, administrative or legislative. Both the mayor
and city council had clearly demonstrated their antipathy
toward the desegretation effort. The court's decision, in fact,
became a rallying cry for those who vowed most fiercely to
resist mandatory desegregation. 1 The school board which had
previously contained one representative of the black community
now has none. This vilification, not only of Judge Doyle, but impliedly of the entire judicial system, bodes ill for the progeny of
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw.
If, however, the court intervenes as handmaiden to an
administration which is acting to carry out a clear legislative
mandate to promote racial equality, it is far more likely to meet
with success. The court's proper role is to adjudiciate, and it
can do that best if the issues are narrowed from a broad constitutional question to one of statutory interpretation. But how
will this be accomplished if we apprehend no national commitment to racial justice? The answer is suggested somewhat
obliquely by Taylor when in the closing pages of his book he
suggests that the easiest way of dealing with racial issues is
to merge them with the general issue of economic deprivation,
both black and white. He thus appears to retreat from the
implications of his original thesis that one cannot attempt to
remedy the problems of urban poverty without dealing directly
with the accompanying problem of racial discrimination, asserting that, "What is needed is a set of national ground rules

19 Keyes v. School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970), rev'd, 445 F.2d 990

(10th Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1972)

(No. 507).

"" See Denver Post, May 13, 1971, at 44, col. 1; Denver Post, May 14, 1971,
at 1, col. 1.
21 Lewis, Parent Group Concerned Over Busing Effects, Denver Post, June

5, 1971, at 12, col. 1.
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establishing the basic conditions of justice and equality under
22
which local government can be made to work for everyone.
What Taylor appears to be suggesting is a concept quite
familiar to constitutional lawyers, namely, the doctrine of procedural due process. Without requiring an explicit commitment
to racial equality, one might find considerable popular support
for processes at the local level which afforded citizens generally
the right to participate fully in the conduct of their government. While cases of the posture of Hawkins inevitably place
courts in political jeopardy, a case calling for the court to
enforce national guidelines guaranteeing the right of a town's
1,500 black and 1,000 white citizens to participate more fully
in the apportionment of municipal services would not only
better insulate the court from political tempests but enable it
to perform a function for which it has more familiar and far
more widely accepted standards.
Courts are traditionally called upon to enforce standards
which relate to the procedural attributes of public proceedings.
Thus, at all levels of government, we have tried to insure that
the decisionmaking process incorporates notice to all interested
parties and an opportunity for them to be heard prior to the
rendering of a decision. These procedural safeguards are often
overlooked at the local level, however, so that only a pitifully
small proportion of the citizenry is given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to participate in the decisionmaking
process. By requiring adequate notice and the undertaking of
affirmative efforts to inform the citizenry of forthcoming decisions, and by securing participation in the decisionmaking process by all affected members of the community, federal guidelines could restore to the political arms of government the
primary responsibility for insuring equality in the rendering of
public services. Local government officials would then have an
affirmative duty to seek out the opinions of all interest groups
within a community before a decision could be accorded judicial recognition. Instead of confronting a municipal decision
within the broader framework of public policy, the court would
decide the simpler, and largely factual, issues of compliance
with the procedural guidelines relating to public participation.
Thus the complex decision of how to distribute municipal
services would be made by legislators-not judges.
Without legislative direction, however, there is little doubt
that when a case assumes the stance of Hawkins the court
22

W.

TAYLOR,

supra note

13,

at 289 (italics omitted).
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must in good conscience decide as fairly as it can in accord
with its constitutional mandate. But as this analysis has indicated, in a typical urban setting discrimination may simply be
too subtle to document, an effective remedy virtually impossible
to fashion, and any aggressive judicial solution thwarted by
public hostility. Ironically, it is the irresponsibility of the
political branches of government which makes necessary the
court's entry into these dangerous uncharted waters. The very
least that can be done, both for the cause of racial justice and
for the court, is a legislative declaration which assures procedural due process in local governmental decisionmaking to
all citizens. To advocate procedural fairness as a solution to
racial imbalance necessarily runs counter to the thesis that
racial problems must be confronted as a separate issue, but the
frustrations of the past decade must convince us that judicial
enforcement of procedural safeguards rather than a wide-ranging vindication of substantive rights is more likely to produce
an effective and permanent response.
Alan Merson*

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.

